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Summary 
 
As the widespread use and acceptance of Bluetooth continues 
concerns are being raised related to security vulnerabilities and 
privacy issues inherent in the use of this technology. Inadequate 
device resources and lack of user awareness has compounded 
this issue where the emphasis on design constraints, functionality 
and ease of use sometimes outweigh security concerns. Recently 
some concerns have being highlighted relating to the possible 
security vulnerabilities in commonly used devices, and also the 
possibility of the imperceptible tracking of device users through 
the use of distributed and connected Bluetooth sensor nodes. 
This paper discusses some of these issues and highlights a 
number of vulnerabilities in the current generation of Bluetooth 
enabled devices. In particular, the current methods being used to 
exploit these vulnerabilities are discussed and the results from a 
case study are presented which identify the percentage of popular 
devices susceptible to this type of misuse.  
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Introduction 
Bluetooth is a short range wireless communication 
technology developed for home, office and mobile 
Personal Area Networks use [1]. In recent years Bluetooth 
has been successfully integrated into mobile phones, 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and other consumer 
devices.  An essential element in ensuring the widespread 
adoption and utilisation of Bluetooth technology by the 
general public is the requirement for a low expectation of 
end user technical ability and minimum levels of user 
setup and configuration for ease of use.  As a consequence 
some users are not aware of the functionality Bluetooth 
offers and its potential for exploitation and in many cases 
leave the default settings on their devices unchanged, a 
situation compounded by the relatively low power 
consumption of the Bluetooth chipsets and consequent 
impact on battery usage. Some commonly used Bluetooth 
enabled devices are vulnerable to exploitation using a 
range of methods including Bluesnarf [2], Backdoor [3] 
and Bluebug [4]. These vulnerabilities can expose the user 
to a range of issues relating to privacy and security and are 
explored here.  
 
 
In particular, the issue of user-tracking exploiting this 
technology is highlighted and the results of a recent case 
study are also presented on the percentage of popular 
devices which are susceptible to this type of misuse. 
Section 2 of this paper identifies a number of recent 
exploitation techniques and their implications. Section 3 
discusses an architecture for the imperceptible and passive 
tracking of Bluetooth users and section 4 presents the 
results of a study related to the use of this architecture for 
passive tracking.   
2. Bluetooth vulnerabilities  
Bluesnarf attacks [2] are the use of Bluetooth technology 
to access restricted areas of a users’ device without their 
knowledge or approval for the purpose of  capturing data 
e.g. contacts, images, lists of called missed, received or 
dialed, calendars, business cards and  the device’s 
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI).  
Bluesnarfing works by using the push profile of the Object 
Exchange protocol (OBEX) [5] which is built-in Bluetooth 
functionality for exchanging electronic business cards. 
Instead of pushing a business card the Bluesnarf attack 
pulls using a “get” request looking for files with known 
names e.g. phonebook file (telecom/pb.vcf) or calendar 
file (telecom/cal.vcs).  This vulnerability exists due to the 
manner in which the OBEX push profile was implemented 
in some early Bluetooth phones, which did not require 
authentication from other Bluetooth devices attempting to 
communicate with it.  Accessing information by 
Bluesnarfing was thought to only be possible if the users 
device is in "discoverable" or "visible" mode, but 
Bluesnarf attacks have being carried out on devices set to 
“non-discoverable” mode [2]. To achieve this the 
Bluesnarfing software needs to address the device by its 
unique 48-bit Bluetooth device name. For example, 
uncovering the device name is possible using software 
applications such as RedFang [6]. This application uses a 
brute-force approach to discover device addresses by 
systematically generating every possible combination of 
characters and recording those combinations which get a 
response. Fortunately this approach is time consuming, 
potentially taking hours of computation. 
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The subsequent release of the Bluetooth specification 1.2 
[1] has addressed this problem by adding an anonymity 
mode that masks a device’s Bluetooth physical address.  In 
addition a major privacy concern related to this type of 
attack is the possibility of obtaining the IMEI of a device 
which can then be utilised to uniquely identify a phone on 
a mobile network and could also be used in illegal phone 
cloning. This could give someone the ability to use a 
cloned subscriber identity module (SIM) card to track a 
mobile device and by inference the user carrier without 
their knowledge. Recent firmware upgrades have 
corrected this problem but many phone owners have not 
installed them. A list of mobile phones which were 
vulnerable to the Bluesnarf attack are available here [2]. 
The Backdoor attack [2] involves establishing a trust 
relationship through a devices pairing mechanism and also 
ensuring that the established relationship no longer 
appears in the users register of paired devices. The only 
time the owner can be aware of the connection is if they 
are observing their device at the precise moment a 
connection is established. Once the pairing has being 
established the attacker will be able to utilise any resource 
on the target that the device allows access to without the 
owner's knowledge or consent, for example, file transfers 
and access to other services including the Internet, WAP 
and GPRS gateways. Once successfully completed the 
Backdoor attack enables other vulnerabilities, e.g. 
Bluesnarf without the usual restrictions applying.  The 
Bluebug attack [2] creates a serial profile connection to a 
device giving full access to the AT command set which 
can then be exploited using widely available tools 
including PPP for networking and Gnokii [7] for 
messaging, contact management, diverts and initiating 
calls. Using this exploit it is possible to use the phone to 
initiate calls, send and read SMS messages, connect to 
data services and monitor conversations without the 
knowledge of the phone owner. Again a successful 
Bluebug attack enables other vulnerabilities e.g. 
Bluesnarfing. Recent firmware upgrades have corrected 
this problem but as before many phone owners have not 
installed them. A list of mobile phones vulnerable to the 
Bluebug type attacks are available here [2]. 
 
Each Bluetooth device is uniquely identified by a fixed 
address which an active Bluetooth chipset in visible mode 
(Inquiry Scan Mode enabled) openly discloses to devices 
scanning any given area. This need for visibility is a 
fundamental requirement for establishing Bluetooth 
connections but this characteristic could be misused with 
the potential to imperceptibly track the device user. 
Exploiting this characteristic requires a large number of 
synchronized and connected Bluetooth nodes which when 
correctly implemented could provide accurate data on the 
device user’s movements within a fixed area, passively 
and without the owners’ permission or awareness.  
To further investigate the scope and implications of this 
issue an extended version of the Bluetrack system [8] from 
Rostock University in Germany was deployed over the 
University of Ulster, Magee campus covering a large 
physical area with a high concentration and throughput of 
pedestrian traffic. The Bluetrack system consists of 
distributed sensor nodes which actively retrieve 
information from Bluetooth devices within their range. 
This information includes a device’s Bluetooth address, 
name and manufacturer which can then be time stamped 
and stored centrally for further analysis or manipulation. 
The next section discusses the system architecture and 
implementation process used to gather this data. 
3. Bluetrack Implementation and Extensions  
The Bluetrack system is illustrated in Fig. 1 and is 
composed of distributed Bluetooth inquiry nodes 
(transceivers) relaying detected device information back to 
a central server across a standard TCP/IP connection. The 
distributed nodes periodically scan their environment for 
Bluetooth enabled devices using the Bluetooth inquiry 
procedure. Data on any discovered devices are written to a 
server side database where it is time stamped and tagged 
showing where and when the device was discovered. 
Access to this data and system configuration is via a web 
browser. The stored data is then compared to the IEEE 
registration authority’s Organizationally Unique Identifier 
(OUI) listing for registered Bluetooth addresses which 
identifies the device manufacturer [9].   
 
 
 
Fig. 1: System Architecture. 
 
In addition the device model can be identified using the 
Bluetooth friendly name which over 20% of users leave as 
default on their devices and do not change after purchase. 
Fig.2 illustrates a Graphical User Interface (GUI) which 
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was developed as a front end to the system which 
enhanced the default interface provided by the 
administration software on the server [10].     
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Screenshot showing Bluetooth devices present. 
 
The GUI consists of a map of the area covered by the 
nodes, the location of the transceivers (red squares) and 
the identified devices (black dots) with associated 
Bluetooth friendly name. The graph on the right hand side 
of the GUI displays the number of devices detected during 
user selected time scales and provides a range of statistics 
related to where devices were discovered and in what 
order. 
 
 
4. Case Study 
 
The data presented in this section was gathered over a five 
day period during the University autumn teaching 
semester using strategically placed nodes. In this study 
two issues will be investigated, firstly the percentage of 
commonly used devices with Bluetooth vulnerabilities and 
secondly, the use of Bluetooth technology as a means of 
passively and imperceptibly tracking device users.   
 
4.1 Devices vulnerable to attack  
 
Over 340 Bluetooth enabled devices were detected during 
the five day period of this study with the percentage of 
devices detected broken down by manufacturer 
comparable in magnitude to their market share [11]. Of the 
node devices detected 69 specific manufacturers and 
models using only the default Bluetooth friendly name on 
the mobile phone. Of these mobile devices 10 were found 
to be vulnerable to Bluesnarf or Bluebug attacks, however, 
none of the devices detected in this particular survey were 
at risk from a Backdoor attack. Fig.3 illustrates the 
percentage of the 69 detected vulnerable devices by 
manufacturer. If the level of model identification could be 
improved using Blueprint [12] for example, then based on 
the figures above, over 50 out of the 340 devices detected 
could be at risk to attack.   
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Possible vulnerable devices detected by 
manufacturer 
 
4.2 Passive user tracking  
 
In addition to detecting devices vulnerable to attack, the 
possibility of using Bluetooth enabled devices to passively 
track users was also investigated.  The detection system 
used in this study allowed the presence of a user in a 
particular area to be confirmed but with a limited level of 
accuracy. However, with the adoption of the new 
Bluetooth 1.2 standard [1] a more accurate level of device 
tracking should be feasible, as this standard proposes an 
“Inquiry with RSSI” mechanism that also measures signal 
strength.  The tracking data recorded over a five day 
period detected an average of 115 unique devices on a 
daily basis.  Figure 4 presents an example location profile 
of one mobile device with the Bluetooth friendly name 
GX25, which the system tracked.  Through further 
investigation it was found that the device belonged to a 
student in the engineering building. Using this proposed 
detection system clearly highlights the student’s 
attendance patterns during the day. The detected presence 
of GX25 on two different nodes (‘isecWireless-128’ 
located in room MG208 and the ‘isecWireless-133’ node 
in room MG203) was due to the close proximity of the 
nodes. This issue could be resolved by moving the nodes 
to ensure their areas of coverage do not overlap. Similarly 
Fig. 5 shows the detection of two devices (Linneything’ 
and ‘K700i’) over a one day period. Again the issue of 
some overlap between nodes is a problem however it does 
show the users movements within the building and could 
be fine-tuned and extended if needed to get a more 
complete and accurate picture of  their movements if 
needed.  Statistics similar to Figures 4 and 5 could also be 
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generated for any of the other 339 devices detected during 
the test period. However the examples presented provided 
a better profile of the benefits from tracking Bluetooth 
devices. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Sample trace of device tracking data. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Two samples of intermittent device tracking. 
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5. Summary and scope for future work 
 
Nokia and Sony Ericsson have acknowledged the 
existence of these vulnerabilities and the potential for 
attacks of this nature on some of their mobile devices [13]. 
As a preventative measure both manufacturers advised 
users to set their Bluetooth devices to ‘undiscoverable’ or 
to simply turn the Bluetooth functionality off. Nokia stated 
that they will not be releasing a fix for vulnerable devices 
as the potential for attacks are limited and not expected to 
be a regular occurrence while Sony Ericsson advised their 
customers to upgrade their phones through a Sony 
Ericsson service centre [13]. In the short term this problem 
may continue to be an issue but given the short shelf live 
of many of these products will reduce in medium short 
term. The problem of user tracking is more complex as it 
is not clear how this issue could be resolved given that 
unique and invariant Bluetooth addresses are the 
fundamental prerequisite for establishing device 
connections. However, it may simply be a trade off 
between the potential sacrifice of an element of personal 
freedom, and the flexibility and functionality offered by 
Bluetooth technology. Future directions will investigate 
the possibility of using Blueprinting [12] in the detection 
system to increase the percentage of device models which 
can be identified.  
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